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ABSTRACT
Interactions with IoT devices generates vast amounts of personal
data that can be used as a source of evidence in digital investiga-
tions. Currently, there are many challenges in IoT forensics such as
the difficulty in acquiring and analysing IoT data/devices and the
lack IoT forensic tools. Besides technical challenges, there are many
concepts in IoT forensics that have yet to be explored such as defini-
tions, experience and capability in the analysis of IoT data/devices
and current/future challenges. A deeper understanding of these
various concepts will help progress the field. To achieve this goal,
we conducted a survey which received 70 responses and provided
the following results: (1) IoT forensics is a sub-domain of digital
forensics, but it is undecided what domains are included; (2) practi-
tioners are already having to examine IoT devices even though they
felt undertrained; (3) requirements for technical training, software
and education are non-existent; (4) high priority on research should
be to develop IoT forensic tools, how to preserve volatile data and
methods to identify and acquire data from the cloud; (5) improve-
ments to forensic tools should be aimed at data acquisition (imaging)
and device disassembly / forensic process; (6) practitioners’ per-
spectives on research direction differ slightly to non-practitioners
in that the focus should be on breaking encryption on IoT devices
rather than focus on cloud data forensics; (7) future research should
focus on developing initiatives and strategies to overcome data
encryption and trail obfuscation in the cloud and ongoing develop-
ment of IoT forensic tools. The responses to the survey question
on the definition of IoT forensics helped us formulate a working
definition. This has provided a clearer understanding of the subject,
which will help further advance the research area.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) has enabled the creation of everyday
objects into smart devices e.g. smart fridges, locks or home assis-
tants, that connect to online services and platforms. The amount
of human interactions with these systems creates a new paradigm
of evidential data. However, the tools and technologies in digi-
tal forensics that are meant for conventional computing are not
fully capable of supporting the IoT infrastructure [39]. Forensic
practitioners now face challenges such as the lack of tools and
methodologies for analyzing IoT devices, exponential increase in
data volume, variety of non-standardized IoT devices [16, 23] and
datasets for training [13]. Additionally, a comprehensive survey
effort has not been conducted to understand the reality of these
challenges.
While there are many technical challenges in IoT and IoT foren-
sics, there are also non-technical ones. For instance, it has yet to be
determined which devices are considered IoT devices, what infor-
mation an investigator can get (hope to get) from these devices, or
how to acquire forensically relevant data [36]. On the other hand,
there are many unexplored areas in IoT forensics such as the type
of resources required in education, training or the specialized skills
forensic investigators need to analyze IoT devices, or the type of
forensic tools or methods to extract data from these devices. Lastly,
there is no clear understanding of the term IoT forensics.
In this paper we present the feedback of 70 respondents to our
20 question online survey with the intention to gain a better un-
derstanding of the key issues in IoT and IoT forensics. We aim to
understand concepts such as its definition as well as current and fu-
ture research directions. In detail, this paper provides the following
contributions:
• It outlines the community’s interpretation and views on con-
cepts such as: IoT in general, IoT devices, and IoT forensics
including types of evidence obtainable from devices.
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• It exemplifies the investigative experiences and capabilities
of practitioners and that many feel unprepared in IoT foren-
sics.
• It discusses the participants’ view on digital evidence found
on IoT devices.
• It identifies and prioritizes current and future research chal-
lenges so that efforts can be concentrated on these issues.
• Based on our survey results and previous work, we present
a working definition of IoT forensics in Section 6.1.
The structure of this paper is as follows: first, we present the
related work where we focus on IoT forensics frameworks and
IoT forensics challenges in Section 2. Next, we outline the survey
methodology in Section 3 followed by the analysis of the results in
Section 4. The limitations are outlined in Section 5. The last two
sections provide a discussion (Section 6), conclusion (Section 7) and
future research.
2 PREVIOUS WORK
For analyzing the previous work, we utilized several repositories
and regular search engines. However, the amount of literature found
was rather limited. For instance, searching on Google for “definition
of IoT Forensics” (in quotes) revealed only 9 results where some
pointed to the same article on different platforms (e.g., [39] can be
found on ieeexplore, dl.acm.org and researchgate).
Therefore, the following subsections start by summarizing the
few existing definitions in Section 2.1, followed by research on
theoretical IoT forensic frameworks in Section 2.2 and a limited
number of practical approaches (see Section 2.3). The challenges
for IoT forensics are discussed in Section 2.4.
2.1 Digital forensics and IoT Forensics
Definitions
At the Digital Forensic Research Workshop (DFRWS) [26] defined
digital forensics as follows:
“The use of scientifically derived and proven methods
toward the preservation, collection, validation, identi-
fication, analysis, interpretation, documentation, and
preservation of digital evidence derived from digital
sources for the purpose of facilitating or furthering the
reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or helping
to anticipate unauthorized actions shown to be disrup-
tive to planned operations.”
Consequently, current attempts to coin IoT forensics are similar.
For instance, [39] defined IoT forensics as a separate branch of dig-
ital forensics and identify it as three different fields: cloud, network
and device level forensics. The authors defined IoT forensics as:
“The identification, collection, organisation and presen-
tation processes deal with IoT infrastructures to establish
facts about incidents.”
Similarly, [24] broke down IoT forensics into domains such as
cloud services, visualization, mobile devices, fixed computing, sen-
sor and RFID technologies and artificial intelligence. While, [1]
separated IoT forensics as a combination of different technology
zones: IoT, network and cloud zones. Although these preliminary
definitions exist, IoT forensics is still in the early stages of research
and thus there is currently no universally accepted definition.
2.2 IoT Forensic Frameworks
Given the limited literature on the definition of IoT forensics, this
section focuses on IoT forensic frameworks and the limited number
of practical approaches which will provide a better understanding
of the different areas that need to be covered in the definition.
In early research, several theoretical frameworks were developed
to conduct investigations on IoT devices. For instance, [24] devel-
oped a model to systematically identify sources (i.e. where to look
for evidence) using 3 zones. Zone 1 focuses on the internal network
(hardware, software and networks (e.g. Bluetooth, Wi-Fi). Zone 2
targets the periphery devices (between internal and external net-
work e.g. IDS/IPS, Gateway or Firewall). Lastly, Zone 3 “covers all
hardware and software that is outside of the network in question"
such as cloud or Internet Service Providers.
[25] presented the Forensics Edge Management System (FEMS)
to provide an autonomous forensic service. A layering approach is
used, with the network layer used to collect data from the sensors,
this is then managed by the perception layer and the application
layer is used to interface with the end users. FEMS collects and
stores the data only if it goes over a predefined threshold.
Besides providing a definition (see Section 2.1), [39] also pro-
posed a Forensic Aware IoT (FAIoT) model. They implemented a
secure, centralized repository so evidence can easily be collected
and analysed. Their approach is to constantly monitor registered
IoT devices and access to the evidence is provided to law enforce-
ment using an API service. A top-down investigative approach is
proposed by [27], based on the triage model and [24] 1-2-3 zon-
ing model, and uses the internal, middle and external networks to
investigate intrusions.
A generic framework called Digital Forensic Investigation Frame-
work for IoT (DFIF-IoT) has been proposed by [18]. They describe
the proactive process which occurs before an incident and the reac-
tive process that occurs after. Recent work by [40] proposed that
an Application Specific Digital Forensic Investigative Model is ben-
eficial in that the collection of evidence is specific to the type of
IoT application. Although the forensic process will be similar de-
pending on the IoT application e.g. smart home,smart city etc. the
extraction methods may differ.
2.3 Practical Approaches
As research progressed, efforts have been focused on recovering
forensic artifacts from consumer IoT devices, from the device itself,
cloud or mobile device.
[22] presented the Forensic State Acquisition from Internet of
Things (FSAIoT). This is a general framework and practical ap-
proach in gathering state changes on IoT devices e.g. device on and
off. In their solution they acquire state changes from the logs in
real time using the Forensic State Acquisition Controller (FSAC).
[5] presented an acquisition framework on a smart home hub. In
their work they extracted and analyzed data from the smart hub’s
flash memory and were able to obtain a list of user interactions
with the smart devices and detailed history of data uploaded to the
cloud.
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[7] proposed a method to extract cloud native artifacts from the
Amazon ecosystem using unofficial APIs. Based on this concept
they proposed a tool called Cloud-Based IoT Forensic Toolkit (CIFT)
that provides identification, acquisition and analysis of native cloud
artifacts.
[10] examined forensic artifacts stored on an iPhone backup file
which were produced by the Nest mobile application. They devel-
oped a tool called the Forensic Evidence Acquisition and Analysis
System (FEAAS) which generates a report listing user events ei-
ther created by the Google Assistant through voice commands or
through the user on the iPhone mobile application.
2.4 IoT Forensic Challenges
The advances in digital systems together with the beginning of the
IoT era has brought us to a crucial period in digital forensics. [11]
identified that many tools and techniques that once worked with
traditional forensics will become obsolete due to the progress of
technology. A recent paper by [20] laid out digital forensics research
for the next five years and found there was a lack of funding towards
research, training and forensic tools in IoT and these should be one
of the most important research opportunities in the future.
The diverse number of IoT devices has made it difficult for foren-
sic investigators to acquire and analyze data using traditional digital
forensic methods. Many IoT systems have varying functions, cus-
tomized operating systems/file structures and a number of wireless
transmission protocols. This makes it difficult to identify and ac-
quire data from IoT devices when no tools or methods have been
developed [8, 16].
Data is often separated and either stored locally or remotely in
the cloud which is out of the users control. Therefore identifying
the location of the data can be a challenge for investigators. Data
may also be stored in a different country, with different regulations
and limitations on investigators having physical accessibility [39].
[11] has identified that many IoT devices use proprietary file
systems and will often require reverse engineering. Many of these
devices create large amounts of data making it time consuming for
an investigator to identify the crucial pieces of evidence related to
the crime. [1] noted that there is limited storage on IoT devices,
which means the data has a short lifespan and will quickly be
overwritten.
3 SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
3.1 Survey creation and design
The following methodology was used to create and disseminate the
survey:
(1) A literature review was conducted (summarized in Section 2).
(2) The survey was designed to gather demographic informa-
tion about the cyber forensic respondents, opinions on the
definitions of IoT forensics, experience in the analysis of
IoT devices and data, current and future research priorities.
The questions were developed from reviewing existing lit-
erature but also reflect discussions/feedback from forensic
practitioners.
(3) We obtained permission through the university’s ethics com-
mittee. This restricted us from collecting any identifiable
information and disclaiming that it posed any risk or harm
to subjects.
(4) The survey was created using the Baseline system and dis-
tributed via various digital forensic mailing lists, groups on
LinkedIn, forensic groups/forums online and private con-
tacts.
(5) All data was exported in XLSX / CSV and downloaded for
offline processing.
(6) The data was analyzed and the descriptive statistics as well
as some cross-comparisons are summarized in the results
section.
Before releasing the survey, it was shared with a small group
to receive initial feedback on the questionnaire. Overall, the final
survey consisted of 20 questions:
• 10 Multiple choice
• 5 Likert scale
• 3 Free response
• 1 Multiple selection (check box)
• 1 Ranking
3.2 Survey overview
3.2.1 Sample considerations. The survey was available online
for eight months before the data was exported. The main target
group were individuals with a cyber forensics background, from
academia and industry with diverse range of experiences and train-
ing. It was also of interest to examine if the perspectives of prac-
titioners and non-practitioners were different in relation to the
priorities of current and future research challenges. Practitioner
motivations may differ in that they have undertaken investigation,
so it was important to ascertain whether their experience had an
impact on their views regarding current research focus and future
challenges.
3.2.2 Survey analysis. While some of the basic analysis was
carried out on the survey platform, the majority of the analysis
was accomplished in Microsoft Excel and R. To analyze free re-
sponse questions, we read all responses, then identified and coded
categories based on frequently used terms, and lastly we grouped
them.
3.2.3 Survey data. Participants were provided with answer op-
tions either nominal or ordinal. When possible, the survey re-
sponses were logically arranged in a meaningful order to increase
the quality of the results. The arrangement of ordinal data allowed
the application of tests designed to identify trends in the responses.
3.2.4 Survey reliability. In total, n = 70 participants submit-
ted responses. The calculated required sample size was n = 60
indicating that the number was large enough to make inferences
from and that statistical tests were unlikely to exhibit type II errors
(two-sided t-test, alpha = 0.05, using a medium effect size of 0.5 and
power of 0.99). It should be noted that we aspired to obtain a higher
response rate, but taking into consideration that IoT forensics is a
relatively new area, we deemed the sample size acceptable.
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4 RESULTS
The results of survey was divided into six sections: demographics,
definitions, IoT forensic investigations, evidence, current and future
challenges in IoT forensics which are reflected in the upcoming
subsections.
4.1 Demographics
The results of the demographics questions are presented in Table 1.
The majority of our (n = 70) participants were either American or
European (80%) and 33-64 years old (83%). Most of the respondents
worked in education or a training facility. 53% of the respondents
had 10 years or more of experience.
The respondents from the education/training facility, were a
mix of researchers, students, professors and industry instructor,
however, 52% were professors. Practitioners accounted for 39%,
working in the private sector organizations or state/local law en-
forcement. Thus, we had a mix of experience, academic researchers
and practitioners that provided input.
4.2 Definitions
This section discusses participants’ definitions of IoT, IoT devices
and IoT forensics. Definitions are important as they enable us to
form an accepted and common understanding of a word or sub-
ject. Thus, they allow for a mutual understanding of a topic under
discussion.
4.2.1 Definition of IoT. IoT is still evolving, therefore, many
interpretations exist and the definition remains fuzzy. A sound def-
inition can provide a better understanding of the subject, lead to
further research and advance the understanding of this emerging
concept. Therefore, the beginning of the survey asked participants
to report their agreement of the definition of IoT. Four definitions
fromWikipedia, NIST, Gartner and IoT Analytics were shown and
participants had to choose between strongly agree to strongly dis-
agree on each of them. The definitions are as follows:
Wikipedia definition [37]:
“The Internet of things is the inter-networking of phys-
ical devices, vehicles, buildings and other items embed-
ded with electronics, software, sensors, actuators, and
network connectivity which enable these objects to col-
lect and exchange data."
NIST definition [35] :
“Jeffrey Voas from NIST defines IoT using a model he
calls the Network of things that relies on 4 key compo-
nents to function, sensings, computing, communication
and actuation. The network of things model relies on
sensors, a communication channel, an aggregator, and
the cloud in order to function. Network of Things Model."
Gartner definition [12]:
“The Internet of Things is sensors and actuators embed-
ded in physical objects that are linked through wired
and wireless networks."
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Federal law enforcement 3
Legal system 1
Private sector organization 23




Law enforcement practitioner 16





Table 1: These percentages account for 70 of the participants
“The Internet of Things (IoT) is the network of physical
objects that contain embedded technology to communi-
cate and sense or interact with their internal states or
the external environment."
All 70 participants answered this question and the results are
shown in Figure 1. Most participants agreed / strongly agreed with
the definition found on Wikipedia (84%) followed by the definition
given by Jeffrey Voas from NIST (71%). However, there is no clear
favorite and participants found all definitions (though different)
valid.
4.2.2 IoT Devices. The next set of questions focused on IoT
devices where participants were asked what they considered to
be an IoT device. From the options offered Smart Home Appliances
received the highest responses (97% agreed) closely followed by
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Definition of IoT
Figure 1: This Likert scale uses a 5 point scale (“strongly agree" to
“strongly disagree"), participants were asked to rank which defini-
tions of IoT they agree and disagree with the most.
Hub based internet devices (89%), Home Assistant (89%) and Internet
connected sensors (86%). Detailed results are summarized in Table 2.
Next, we asked participants whether an IoT device has to be
constantly connected to the Internet. Out of the 69 answers, the
majority (84%) responded with ‘no’. However, this shows that there
is still uncertainty / disagreement as to what exactly constitutes as
an IoT device.
Type of IoT Device Percentage
Self Driving Cars 70
Smart Phones 43
Drones 61
Hub based Internet devices (ex. Internet
connected light bulbs)
89
Internet connected sensors (ex. sensors




Wearables (ex. Smart Watches) 74
Home Assistants (Google Home, Amazon
Alexa, etc)
89
Smart Home Appliances 97
Table 2: This multiple selection checkbox question allowed partic-
ipants to select as many choices they considered applied, partici-
pants were asked to select options that they considered to be an IoT
device
4.2.3 Definition of IoT Forensics. We first asked participants if
they consider IoT forensics a sub-domain of digital forensics where
90% answered with ‘yes’. This shows that it is widely accepted as
a sub-domain and similar to other sub-domains such as mobile
forensics, network forensics etc. where the name of the domain
defines the focus area. However, the ubiquitous nature of IoT devices
makes it difficult to draw a definite conclusion to what domains
are included. The 10% that said ‘no’ to this question were primarily
from private sector.
Next, in a free response question, we asked participants about
their interpretation of IoT forensics. 64 participants responded and
we received a variety of answers. However, we excluded 23 of the
responses as they were either too short (e.g., “digital forensic in the
context of IoT” ), were not specific to IoT forensics or were unclear
(e.g., “internet connected devices, either through Bluetooth or sensors
or TCP/IP” )
We organized the remaining 41 responses (which often included
similar terms), then extracted keywords and clustered them under
one general term as shown below:
• Collection, preservation, analysis and presentation of IoT
devices and data (17)1
• Embedded devices (7)
• Non-traditional computers (6)
• IoT network traffic (4)
• Cloud (3)
• Others (4)
While the above points mostly focus on network and devices, one
respondent addressed necessary skills that “IoT forensics is largely
reverse engineering and is more like forensic analysis of unknown
devices". One individual wrote that “IoT forensics is no different
from other IT and remains parts of digital forensics". While another
commented that “IoT forensics is largely a buzzword for internet
connected devices".
In addition to the above points, one individual referred to how
the evidence can be used: “Dealing with evidence that relates to the
IoT devices themselves (e.g. using them for illegal purposes, evidence of
hacking attacks, etc.) and also evidence that has been gathered by IoT
devices but relates to crimes that are otherwise unrelated (e.g. home
security system knowing that a person was home at a particular time,
cameras capturing events, GPS information from wearables, etc.).”
Interestingly, the responses focus more on IoT devices rather
than the process, outcome of an investigation or a combination
of traditional forensic steps. A detailed list of the results is shown
in A.
4.3 IoT Forensic Investigations
The two subsections focus on investigative experiences and capa-
bilities.
4.3.1 Investigative Experience. To gain a better understanding
of participants’ experience with IoT devices, we asked Have you
ever been involved in an investigation where they have had to analyze
IoT data?. From the 70 responses, 62% (43) answered no, 11% (8)
answered not myself but I know a colleague and 27% (19) marked
yes.
In further analysis, we split the data into practitioners and non-
practitioners as shown in Table 5. The results show that practi-
tioners are already investigation IoT devices. On the other hand, a
high number of non-practitioners have not been involved in IoT
investigations.
Occupation Investigating IoT data / devices
Yes (%) No (%) Total
(%)
Practitioner 16 23 38
Non-practitioner 7 47 54
Other 4 3 7
Total (%) 27 73 100
Table 3: Cross correlating participants occupation vs whether they
have been involved in an IoT investigation
1The parenthetical numbers indicate the number of times a general ideawasmentioned.
ARES ’19, August 26–29, 2019, Canterbury, United Kingdom Tina Wu, Frank Breitinger, and Ibrahim Baggili
The respondents that stated they had either been involved in
an investigation with IoT data or knew a colleague who had, were
asked to include brief case details. Three respondents did not put
any case details as it was either confidential or sub judice. The
following responses were received along with their count:
(a) Home virtual assistant: Amazon Alexa (4), Google home
(b) Smart wearable devices e.g Fitbit (3)
(c) Mobile device that was exposed to IoT devices (2)
(d) CCTV and DVRs (2)
(e) Raspberry Pi for research purposes
(f) Industrial IoT device
(g) IP camera that was found to have been installed without
authorization
(h) Home automation system whereby the contractors have
been accused by the home owner of illegally accessing the
home system
(i) Smart refrigerator
(j) Implanted health device
(k) Smart TV: to recover data to show there was interaction at
a particular time
(l) Infotainment systems from vehicles to show GPS informa-
tion
From these provided case details, it is interesting to see that there
is an association with the answers provided in Section 4.2.2 on ‘IoT
Devices’ where Smart Home Appliances are ranked highest. Besides
our participants, there have been several public cases that involved
some of the points listed beforehand. For instance, in 2015 a man
was charged in a murder investigation based on data extracted from
an Amazon Echo [21]. In another case, data was taken from a Fitbit
device and used in a murder investigation to challenge a suspect’s
version of the events [34].
4.3.2 Investigative Capability. Subsequently, we asked partic-
ipants whether they felt they were in a position to analyze IoT
devices, this included communication channels and network traffic.
This was a free response question with 62 answers which can be
summarized as follows:
• 47% (29) said they were in a position,
• 31% (19) stated they were not and
• 22% (14) were unsure
As this was a free response question the 31% (19) stated that they
had “insufficient training", or felt they were “not fully qualified to do
so". Others also stated they were “close, but encryption would obfus-
cate it". The participants that stated they were unsure mentioned
that it “depended on the type of IoT device e.g. physical interface, OS,
protocols". Some participants thought they were “not quite ready
but working towards it".
For the 47% (29) who said yes they felt capable of analyzing IoT
devices, we correlated them with the question whether they have
been involved in an investigation analyzing IoT devices. This showed
that 11 had been involved in an investigation. Of these 11, half (6)
were practitioners and the majority (10) had ten or more years of
experience. As expected, respondents with 10+ years of experience
were more confident in their capabilities (See Table 4).
This high number of trained employees could be a result of the
[29–31] (RCFL) which “is a one stop, full service forensics laboratory
Years of
experience
Position to analyze IoT devices





Less than a year 1 7 1 10
1-3 years 1 11 3 16
4-6 years 6 4 3 13
7-9 years 3 6 0 9
10+ years 30 19 4 53
Total (%) 41 47 11 100
Table 4: Cross correlating participants experience vs whether they
consider themselves in a position to analyze an IoT device
and training center devoted entirely to the examination of digital
evidence in support of criminal investigations”2.
4.4 Evidence on IoT Devices
Again we used a free response question about evidence which had
two parts. First, we asked participants what type of evidence they
thought could be obtained from IoT devices. Second, we asked why
they think this evidence is important. As with other free response
questions, we summarized / clustered the results. The first part of
the question received the following responses, with the general
themes shown below:
(1) User behaviour (6)
(2) GPS data (6)
(3) Sensor data (5)
(4) Connection history e.g IP addresses (5)
(5) Logs (5)
(6) Data on IoT device states (3)
(7) Data stored on the cloud (2)
(8) Telemetry data (2)
(9) Data from Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
(10) Configuration data
(11) Photos, videos, audio
(12) Records of conversations
(13) Network related information
(14) Heart rate data
(15) Modified firmware
(16) Events records by the IoT device
The second part of the question was to explore the importance
of the evidence which received 21 responses. From those, we first
extracted the comments that were related to why the evidence
was important. The responses were then grouped based on the
most frequently used terms, this also included individual direct
quotations:
• Trace behavioural patterns of users, then use the data to
recreate criminal activity or draw meaningful conclusions
about a suspect’s modus operandi (11)
• Timeline of events to trace incidence in question (2)
• To correlate data
• Determine unexpected behaviour in IoT networks
• Metadata gives clues to what happened
2https://www.rcfl.gov/about (last accessed 2019-01-17).
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• Trace unauthorized interactions and data sharing
• It can tell us something that no human may have observed
• What the state of an environment is at the time an incident
occurs
• That a person has been in a place at a certain time or that a
person has done a certain action
• Aid investigations such as intelligence, criminal, accident,
wrongful death, injury, corporate cases for manufacturing
equipment failure/damage, and larger scope such as elec-
tronic voting
4.5 Current Challenges
This section identifies the important challenges currently faced by
investigators in the IoT environment with regards to legislation,
cloud, training, software and acquisition.
4.5.1 Current Issues. To learn about the current issues, we asked
participants to rank nine topics with 1 being the most important
and 10 being the least. Topics and results are shown in Figure 2. The
results indicated that the important issues are technical training
(82%), software (80%) and education (78%) whereas funding, legal
issues and cloud data storage currently have less relevance.
Technical training holds the highest priority and this reinforces
why over half of the participants felt they were unable to undertake








































Current IoT Forensic Issues
Figure 2: On a scale of 1 to 10 (1 being themost and 10 being the least
important) participants had to rank the various challenges listed on
the left.
A subsequent question asked their view on various statements
regarding legislation, data encryption, cloud and the security of
IoT devices. The exact statements and the results are presented in
Figure 3, which shows that 83% of the respondents thought IoT
devices currently have weak security.
Similar to our findings, a study by [17] points out several other
security challenges in the IoT landscape. These included constraints
on memory and energy on IoT devices which make it hard to port
computationally expensive cryptographic algorithms. With the
growing number of IoT devices, current security schemes lack scal-
ability meaning these schemes would not be suitable for IoT devices.
These challenges could be contributing factors as to why IoT devices
have weak security.
IoT devices having weak security is not unexpected as there
have been many documented security flaws found on consumer
IoT devices such as baby monitors, home security cameras or smart
thermostats [33]. However, legislation is being introduced to combat
weak security on IoT devices, for example, in California a law is
being introduced to ban default passwords [38]. In a similar effort,
the UK government has released a “Code of Practise for Consumer
IoT Security” document which sets out guidelines to ensure the
secure design of IoT consumer products [9].
The majority of respondents strongly disagreed with the state-
ment that Legislation regarding IoT forensics is currently up to date.
This is not surprising as legislation has always been behind tech-
nology and is one of the main challenges in digital forensics [2].
Current legislation that governs the way data is gathered, studied,
analyzed and stored are aimed at traditional computing technol-
ogy [4, 14]. Therefore, in order to standardize processes, training


















cyber forensics is currently
up to date
Legislation is currently too
broad regarding IoT forensics
Data encryption presents a
major problem
Security on IoT devices is
currently weak
Finding data in the cloud
presents a problem for IoT
forensics
100 50 0 50 100
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
Statements regarding IoT Forensics
Figure 3: This Likert scale used a 5 point scale and asked partici-
pants if they agree or disagree with each of the statements listed on
the left.
4.5.2 Research Directions. The participants were asked where
should research be focused on in order to combat current issues. The
majority of participants thought that research should focus on the




















IoT forensic tools 27 30 57
Breaking data encryp-
tion on IoT devices
13 7 20
Memory retrieval 7 11 19
No answer 1 2 3
Total (%) 77 123 200
Table 5: Cross correlating whether participants have been involved
in an investigation vs where research should be focused
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We then cross-correlated these results with the practitioners
and non practitioners. This showed that both groups thought IoT
forensic tools and preserving volatile data were the most important
areas. However, practitioners thought breaking encryption on IoT
devices is a more important area to focus on than non-practitioners,
who ranked cloud data forensics higher as shown in Table 5.
4.5.3 Improvements to Tools. Focusing on tools, we asked par-
ticipants what areas of improvements are required in forensic and
software tools used on IoT devices. The results are shown in Table 6
and show the respondents thought data acquisition / imaging (73%)
and device disassembly forensic process (63%) are the most in need
of improvement.
We continued to study whether the results would differ from the
perspectives of practitioners and non-practitioners and found no
difference. We also cross-correlated this against whether they had
been involved in an investigation and again found no difference.




Data acquisition [Imaging] 73
Data encryption 30
Memory acquisition 43
Device disassembly and forensic process 63
Other 6
Table 6: The multiple selection checkbox question allowed partici-
pants to select as many areas in forensic and software tools which
need improvements.
4.5.4 Challenges in Acquisition. To gain a better understanding
of acquisition challenges, we asked participants what they consid-
ered to be the most challenging area. Out of the 68 responses, 38%
considered cloud storage as the most challenging area followed
by on-device memory (28%), on-device storage (19%) and network
(15%). When looking at this together with the question areas of
research to focus on to combat current issues, one of the main areas
highlighted was cloud data forensics; this was also highlighted as
being the most challenging area to find (Section 4.5.1) and acquire
data from. This is a clear indication that finding easier ways to iden-
tify and acquire data from the cloud should be a priority research
area in cloud data forensics.
We investigated whether there was any difference of opinions
between practitioners and non-practitioners which is summarized
in Table 7. We found practitioners thought on-device storage and
on-device memory as the most challenging area to acquire evidence.
Whereas, non-practitioners thought cloud storage and on-device
memory is most challenging.
4.6 The Future Challenges
The last question was a Likert scale question and focused on future
challenges. In particular, we asked participants to rate how much
they agree or disagree that the following present a challenge to the
future of IoT forensics. The results are shown in Figure 4 and indicate











Cloud storage 7 30 37




Network 4 10 14
No answer 3 0 3
Total (%) 39 61 100
Table 7: Cross correlating what participants considered challenging
in acquisition vs their primary occupation
(particularly as it pertains to cloud forensics) are the most challeng-
























it pertains to cloud forensics)
Evidence modeling
Limitations on local storage
Legal jurisdiction
Malware/device security issues
Lack of digital forensic tools
100 50 0 50 100
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
Future Challenges in IoT Forensics
Figure 4: This Likert scale uses a 5 point scale (“strongly agree" to
“strongly disagree"), participants were asked to rank which of the
statements would be challenging for the future of IoT forensics by
agree and disagree with the most.
5 LIMITATIONS
There are several limitations in this survey. First, this survey only
had 70 participants which is a small number and answers may vary
with a larger group participating. Secondly, the demographical
distribution is not even, as the majority came from America or
Europe, were primarily males, had 10+ years of experience and
were occupied in the education/training facility sector. Thirdly,
although being very careful, there is the possibility for human error
while analyzing the results especially the free-response questions
which cannot be automated.
6 DISCUSSION
The results from this survey have identified a number of key issues
in IoT forensics.
6.1 Towards a definition for IoT Forensics
Based on the definitions summarized in Section 2.1 and the re-
sponses from our survey, we propose the following working defini-
tion for IoT forensics:
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“Internet of Things (IoT) forensics is a sub-domain of
digital forensics and involves the collection, preserva-
tion, analysis and presentation of data obtained from
IoT devices for the purpose of collating historical data
of interactions from IoT device(s) to reconstruct crimi-
nal / exonerating events or obtaining remnants of data
that indicates a malicious act or exploitation of an IoT
device. It consists of various domains / skills including
networking, embedded device, cloud, mobile, host based
forensics and reverse engineering."
Note, that there was some disagreement on what constitutes an
IoT device (discussed in Section 4.2.2) e.g. disagreement on an IoT
device needing a constant Internet connection. As IoT forensics
develops, participant views may change and a universal definition
may be accepted.
As a follow-up to the survey, we posted our working definition
of IoT forensics to various mailing lists and forums and received
the following feedback: one respondent felt they “Did not think
that IoT as being just solely a criminal events or data that would
indicate malicious acts or exploitation", while another respondent
wrote that embedded devices should be changed to “embedded
systems" as this would then cover traditional embedded devices.
Another respondent felt that the collection of data was not only
from the IoT device but also any system(s) connected to the IoT
device. Based on these recommendations we updated the definition
and concluded the following:
“Internet of Things (IoT) forensics is a sub-domain of
digital forensics and involves the collection, preserva-
tion, analysis and presentation of data obtained from or
connected to the IoT device(s). The purpose of this is to
collate historical data of interactions from or connected
to the IoT device(s) to reconstruct the events involving a
malicious act or exploitation of an IoT device to be used
for civil or criminal proceedings. It consists of various
domains / skills including network, embedded systems,
cloud, mobile, host based forensics and reverse engineer-
ing."
6.2 Readiness for IoT
In terms of capability of analyzing IoT devices, 53% of the partici-
pants felt they were either not or unsure they were in the position
to analyze IoT devices. The participants that said they were not or
unsure stated that this was due to “insufficient training" or felt they
were “not fully qualified". On the other hand, this was an objective
question and therefore we do not know what skills the 47% (an-
swering yes) have. In order to counteract short term, we may need
more training and education facilities for IoT forensics to prepare
law enforcement. There has to be expert discussion of the skills
needed by investigators in the area of IoT forensics. Maybe it is
insufficient to only operate tools; maybe we need highly technical
people (e.g., reverse engineering experts). This is further supported
by the responses when the participants were asked to rank issues
IoT forensics is facing today, with the most important issues being
technical training, software and education.
Issues regarding the lack of training have previously been high-
lighted in research in the field of cyber forensics. [15] found that
the cyber forensic field required more Education, Training and Cer-
tification (ETC) facilities, newer programs, revision of the current
curriculum and more funding in training materials should be one
of the highest priorities.
6.3 Lack of IoT Forensic Tools
The findings from this survey found the majority of participants
thought that research should specifically focus on developing tools
in IoT forensics to identify and acquire data from the cloud. This
coincides with a study published by [20] who found that there is a
lack of forensics tools in general which included IoT forensic tools.
Currently only a few IoT forensics tools have been developed.
This includes cloud acquisition tool that acquires cloud-native arti-
facts [7] , however this tool has only been developed and tested on
the Alexa ecosystem. [5] found from their previous experience of
using unofficial APIs that they can change without notice, making
this an unreliable method of extraction.
[10] developed a tool that automatically acquires artifacts from
iOS devices. Their tool presents a readable report that provides a
timeline of user events and whether the mobile application or voice
command through the Google Assistant triggered an event.
[5] extracted data from a smart hub, however they have only
presented amethod that works speciallywith theAlmond smart hub
and no tool was developed to automatically extract or analyze the
data. Therefore further research should be focused on developing
IoT forensic tools that would work reliably across a range of devices.
Many of these tools have been developed for specific tasks such
as the analysis of data from iOS or acquisition and analysis of cloud
native artifacts. There has been no effort to provide any interoper-
ability with each other. This makes it difficult and time-consuming
for a investigator as they are unable to establish a correlation be-
tween multiple sources of evidence. Hence, a tool needs to be de-
veloped so historical patterns of activity can be established from
various data sources.
6.4 Challenges
The majority of participants thought the cloud as one of the key ar-
eas of current research, more specifically identifying and acquiring
data in the cloud. There are several possible reasons why the cloud
is one of the challenges; the cloud infrastructure is normally under
the control of the IoT provider, the actual physical location of the
data could be hidden or potentially cross different boundaries of ju-
risdictions, and distributed across cloud computing platforms [28].
Another reason could be that access to data within the cloud can
only be provided with user credentials. Although there is a potential
to obtain these during the investigation, the lack of certainty can
prevent the progress of an investigation [25].
The findings have also highlighted that data encryption and
trail obfuscation (cloud) are key areas that need to be focused on
in future research. Both data encryption and trail obfuscation are
anti-forensic techniques already known as obstacles in digital foren-
sics. Future research should work on initiatives and strategies to
address these growing problems. Data encryption presents a major
challenge and has already been highlighted in previous literature
as a continuous problem [6]. The results show that participants are
also worried about data encryption in the IoT domain. Maybe we
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have to focus on more non-traditional approaches, for example, [32]
identified the potential of electromagnetic side channel as a method
to analyse encrypted devices.
Trail obfuscation in the cloud has been highlighted as one of
the future challenges in IoT forensics. It could be a problem for the
future when data is deleted from the cloud making it difficult to gain
remote access. Data may be recoverable however it is challenging
to recover and identify ownership [19].
Jurisdiction and legislation was regarded as a relatively low
priority for current research and future challenges. However, as
there was only one representative from the legal profession in the
demographic, we think a follow-up survey targeting the judiciary
viewpoint would be beneficial. This would help identify any legal
issues such as privacy.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this work, we presented and discussed the 70 responses of our
20-question online survey. Our results show while participants
agree on some aspects of IoT forensics (e.g. that IoT forensics is a
sub-domain of digital forensics), there is also disagreement on IoT,
IoT devices and IoT forensics (e.g. which devices are considered IoT
devices, and whether IoT devices are constantly connected).
Participants agreed that IoT forensics includes a wide range of
domains which makes it difficult to draw a definite conclusion as
to what is included (e.g. cloud, network and reverse engineering).
When asked to define IoT forensics, respondents were mostly fo-
cused on the different types of IoT devices instead of an actual
definition. Thus, to come up with the definition for IoT forensics,
we primarily focused on the definition for digital forensics (quoted
in Section 2.1) and expanded it by adding the sub-domain specific
properties. Although this definition is a good starting point, it will
require further refinement and validation as the field develops.
Additionally, our results show that participants (∼ 30%) have
had experience in examining IoT devices / data although over 50%
did not feel prepared. As a consequence, we need to think about
increasing education programs / technical training to prepare the
workforce to deal the exponential increase in the usage of IoT
devices.
Results following this survey indicated that there are many IoT
forensic challenges ahead, as technology develops these challenges
will increase. We summarize the key findings as follows:
• Besides education, participants see major challenges in en-
cryption and cloud storage which overlaps with other exist-
ing literature
• The most important research areas identified are developing
IoT forensic tools, how to preserve volatile data and cloud
data forensics
• With limited IoT forensic tool the focus on development of
tools should be on identifying and acquiring data from the
cloud
IoT forensics is a relatively new topic and we received responses
from 70 participants. We expect the field to progress and grow in
the future, a follow up survey could then be conducted with a larger
sample size. Also, the working definition of IoT forensics would
need to be further refined and validated.
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A RESPONSES FROM PARTICIPANTS’ INTERPRETATION OF IOT FORENSICS
The tables shown below represents 41 responses from participants’ interpretation on IoT forensics. For a discussion of these see Section 4.2.3.
Category Response
Collection, preservation, analysis
and presentation of IoT devices and
data
Investigation/analysis of real-time and prior crimes committed using IoT; the collection of evidence/data artefacts (footprints) from the IoT
sensors/actuators/nodes/devices that would aid law enforcement in resolving cases.
IoT forensics is the application of the digital forensics process to handling potential evidence that might be contained in an IoT device.
The identification, preservation, collection, analysis and presentation of data from any ’smart’ device.
IoT forensics the smart forensic methodology for investigate IoT based crimes into more deeper level .
The necessity of analysing data from objects we wouldn’t in the past have expected to contain personal information, for example refrigerators
and light bulbs.
IoT forensics is the practice of collecting, analysing, and reporting on digital data acquired from physical devices that have the ability to
connect, communicate and exchange data over wired or wireless networks.
IoT forensics is a forensic sciences branch which deals with the development of scientifically proven methods to acquire evidence from IoT
devices and to analyse this evidence.
The use of forensically methods and tools to investigate IoT Devices (e.g. Smart Meters) to get digital evidences which are proof for a court of
law.
The analysis of data created by IoT devices in order to get insights for a forensic case
Examination of IoT devices and IoT data with the goal to find evidence for actions taken or omitted.
Gathering evidence and presenting the analysis of the evidence in a legally admissible way.
Investigation process of an incident that involves internet enabled device, which includes the identification of the source of instantiation of
connection.
Digital forensic examination and analysis of IoT devices and data
The recovery and interpretation of data from IoT systems in order to create understanding of the events which led to the data being deposited.
The location, collection and analysis of cyber forensic data from components of the IoT, whether purely local or at aggregation and transmission
points. It also include analysis of the analyses of IoT data.
Analysis of sensors and controls with communications. Std Who what when where and how
IoT forensics is the systematic processing of an IoT devices that is mostly likely a portion of an investigation.
Embedded Devices
Recovery and analysis of data relevant to investigation from any specialized (not general purpose computing) internet connected device
The retrieval and analysis of artefacts retained on and sent by embedded devices to local or remote instances including the cloud and social
media
The acquisition and processing of data collected from embedded devices that have an internet component that is part of its function.
The process of extracting (collecting) relevant data from networked physical devices and embedded electronic items for analysis purposes.
Forensics in IoT devices Like embedded devices which have (in)direct connection over the internet to a central resource for example for
Management purposes or control of the devices states.
Embedded device in electronic log and data investigations
I would consider IoT forensics, the analysis of data generated by special purpose embedded systems. Smart watches are becoming general
purpose, as tablets and phones already are, and there are forensic tools for them. There are relatively few such tools for things like nest
thermostat, ring doorbell, video surveillance, industrial control, vehicle control, healthcare diagnostics, electronic voting. The tools tend to
be platform specific, and because embedded software platforms may be shared between these, it may be helpful to consider how that affects
the practice. Also consider that, from a forensics perspective, we are likely primarily interested in the data from the devices, which means
either devices that retain data, or cloud forensics of data uploaded. Do we draw a line between cloud acquisition, and acquisition from
devices themselves? Probably not. Look at cell phone forensics, where the tools for imaging phones are taking on features to use credentials
from the phone to download data from associated cloud services.
Non-Traditional Computing
Examination of IP connected devices which are not regular computers, PCs, smart phones, tablets etc
Forensics on small-resource network nodes
Analysis of non-PC electronics
IoT forensics is the act of recovering evidence from network enabled devices that are not traditional computers.
Forensic of the equipment which have internet connection data and which is not classified as computer or mobile forensic
IoT forensics is the analysis of ’host’ and network based artifacts of non-traditional devices that have little computers and the ability to
communicate over the internet or within an intra-net.
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Category Response
IoT Network Traffic
Studying the underlying hidden data/communications being sent or stored by IoT type devices. This could include traditional networking
appliances as well.
IoT forensics consists of systems and methods to investigate potential incidents in IoT networks for creating, collecting, analysing and
evaluating data as evidence. Compared to computer forensics IoT forensics can be seen as a specialization taking care of highly distributed,
loosely coupled, unreliable networks and resource constrained devices.
Acquisition and analysis of evidence from IoT devices. This can be evidence stored on device itself, or communicated elsewhere, and may
include more abstract sources such as network patterns, etc.
Imaging (capturing) and analysing volatile and non-volatile storage and network traffic related to an IoT device
Cloud
IoT is a branch of digital forensics which deals with IoT related crimes and includes investigation of the connected devices, the sensors as well
as the cloud of data.
Getting information from IoT devices which presented in court can be held as evidence. This can be in the cloud, in the network, in the device
(chip-off) etc.
IoT forensics is the acquisition and analysis of at-rest device and cloud-resident data from a sensor or single-function device. It is also the
reverse-engineering and analysis of data in-transit between the IoT device and its ultimate destination.
Others
I think IoT is largely a buzzword for Internet connected devices that are "specific purpose computing" as opposed to "general purpose
computing". Forensics is the usual definition of processes/tools to collect/analyse digital evidence.
Dealing with evidence that relates to the IoT devices themselves (e.g. using them for illegal purposes, evidence of hacking attacks, etc.) and
also evidence that has been gathered by IoT devices but relates to crimes that are otherwise unrelated (e.g. home security system knowing
that a person was home at a particular time, cameras capturing events, GPS information from wearables, etc.).
Why IoT forensics! It is all Forensic Research, some components are connected through any kind of protocol is that IoT? Of course IoT differs
from other IT, but it remains part of Digital Forensics.
The biggest difference between IoT forensics and other digital forensics is that IoT forensics is largely reverse engineering. IoT devices are so
diverse that one can never be an ’IoT expert’ and it is really more about the forensic analysis of unknown digital devices.
ARES ’19, August 26–29, 2019, Canterbury, United Kingdom Tina Wu, Frank Breitinger, and Ibrahim Baggili
B COMPLETE SURVEY QUESTIONS
In the following is the complete survey questions:
Questions 1: What is your country of residence?
• Drop down list provided











Questions 4: How many years have you worked in cyber forensics?





Questions 5: What is your primary occupation in cyber forensics?
• Law enforcement practitioner






Questions 6: Which category does your occupation most fit into?
• Federal law enforcement




• Private sector organization
• Other




Questions 8: Please rate how much you agree/disagree with the
following definitions of what IoT is:
• The Internet of things is the internetworking of physical
devices,vehicles,buildings and other items embedded with
electronics, software,sensors, actuators,and network connec-
tivity which enable these objects to collect and exchange
data.
• Jeffrey Voas from NIST defines IoT using a model he calls the
Network of things that relies on 4 key components to func-
tion, sensings, computing, communication and actuation.
The network of things model relies on sensors, a commu-
nication channel, an aggregator, and the cloud in order to
function
• The Internet of Things(IoT) is the network of physical ob-
jects that contain embedded technology to communicate and
sense or interact with their internal states or the external
environment.
• The Internet of Things is sensors and actuators embedded in
physical objects that are linked through wired and wireless
networks
Questions 9: What do you consider to be an IoT device? (Check all
that apply)
• Smart Home Appliances
• Self Driving Cars
• Smart Phones
• Drones
• Hub based Internet devices (ex. Internet connected light
bulbs)
• Internet connected sensors (ex. sensors monitoring power
plants and factory machines.)
• Bluetooth peripherals
• Wearables (ex. Smart Watches)
• Home Assistants (Google Home, Amazon Alexa, etc)




Questions 11: Have you ever been involved with an investigation
where you have to analyze IoT data?
• Yes
• No
• Not myself but I know of a colleague who has.
Questions 12: In your own words, what is IoT forensics?
• Text submission accepted
Questions 13: Would you consider yourself in a position to analyze
an IoT device including its communications channels and network
traffic?
• Text submission accepted
Questions 14: How would you rank the following issues IoT foren-








• Cloud Data Storage
• Research
Questions 15: What evidence do you think we can acquire from IoT
devices? Why is this evidence important?
• Text submission accepted
Questions 16: What are the areas that are most in need of improve-
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• Data Encryption
• Memory acquisition
• Device disassembly and forensic process
• Other






Questions 18: Please rate how much you agree or disagree with the
following statements:
• Legislation regarding IoT cyber forensics is currently up to
date
• Legislation is currently too broad regarding IoT forensics
• Data encryption presents a major problem
• Security on IoT devices is currently weak
• Finding data in the cloud presents a problem for IoT forensics
Questions 19:Where should research be focused in order to combat
current issues? (select up to 2)
• Legislation updates
• Jurisdictional issues
• Cloud data forensics
• Preserving volatile data
• IoT Forensic Tools
• Breaking Data Encryption on IoT Devices
• Memory Retrieval
Questions 20:Please rate how much you agree or disagree that the
following present a challenge to the future of IoT forensics:
• Data encryption
• Trail obfuscation(particularly as it
• Pertains to cloud forensics)
• Evidence modeling
• Limitations on local storage
• Legal jurisdiction
• Malware/device security issues
• Lack of digital forensic tools
